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COMBINATORIAL AUCTION THEORY APPLIED TO THE   








The purpose of this project is to investigate the potential retention and cost 
impacts of offering combinations of retention base incentives to members of the Surface 
Warfare Officer (SWO) community. The SWO community has experienced the lowest 
junior officer retention rate of all Unrestricted Line Officer (URL) communities since the 
early 1990s.  The community is required to maintain at least 275 junior officers annually, 
in order to fill operational Department Head billets, in support of sustaining maritime 
mission requirements.  Due to numerous community dissatisfiers, however the SWO 
community has been unable to produce the required force strength of 275 Department 
Heads.   Introduction of a monetary bonus was the SWO community’s answer to 
addressing its critical junior officer retention rates.  Nonetheless, retention rates are still 
critically low and are viewed negatively by many junior officers, because the monetary 
bonus does not address the reasons junior officers are dissatisfied with the community.  
Several non-monetary incentives have been identified by junior SWOs as possible tools 
to increase retention rates.  This project will build a Combinatorial Auction Model to 
include both monetary and non-monetary incentives to determine how combinations of 
incentives can be used to offer the greatest value to retained officers, at the least cost to 
the Navy’s SWO community. 
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The purpose of this project is to investigate the potential retention and cost 
impacts of offering combinations of retention base incentives to members of the Navy’s 
Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) community. The SWO community has experienced the 
lowest junior officer retention rate of all Unrestricted Line Officer (URL) communities 
since the early 1990’s.  The community is required to maintain at least 275 junior officers 
annually to fill operational Department Head billets and sustain maritime mission 
requirements.  Due to numerous community dissatisfiers, however, the SWO community 
has been unable to produce a stable stream of Department Heads.   Introducing a 
monetary bonus was the SWO community’s initial answer to address its critical junior 
officer retention rates.  Today, however, retention rates remain critically low primarily 
because the monetary bonus doesn’t adequately address the needs of the current 
generation of junior officers coming into the Navy.  Previous research conducted 
identified several non-monetary incentives that junior SWOs viewed as possible tools to 
increase retention rates.  This project will build a Combinatorial Auction Model to 
include both monetary and non-monetary incentives to determine how combinations of 
incentives can be used to offer greater value to officers at a lower cost to the Navy’s 
SWO community.   
B. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I explains the purpose of this MBA Project and the questions that this 
project will attempt to answer.  Chapter II provides a literature review on the background 
of the Surface Warfare Community and the problems with retaining SWOs in general, 
and more specifically the retention problems that exist at the Department Head level.  
Chapter III lays out our survey findings and provides some insight into the monetary 
values that SWOs assign to a variety of retention factors.  It will also serve to identify the 
continuing problems with retention and motivation in the Surface Warfare community. 
Chapter V will provide a model which will allow officers to choose from a variety of 
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monetary and non-monetary incentives in an effort to get them to reveal their true value 
of a combination of incentives.  Chapter IV will discuss some of the open ended 
questions in our survey in an effort to capture any recurring themes that become evident 
in our survey responses.  Chapter VI will provide a conclusion to our project and will 
offer recommendations for further research in this area of study.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research answers the following questions regarding the efforts of the Navy to 
retain Surface Warfare Officers at the Department Head level: 
• Primary Question:  
• How might offering a combination of non-monetary incentives, in 
addition to SWOCP assist the Navy in closing the gap at the SWO 
Department Head level? 
• Secondary Question: 
• Why are Surface Warfare Officers continuing to leave the Navy 
prior to their Department Head Tours? 
• What incentive(s) do SWOs value most? 
• What value in terms of dollars do SWOs assign to their preferred 
incentives? 
• How might a combinatorial auction mechanism be used to 
determine both which officers should be retained, determine which 
incentives should be given to each retained officer, and 
simultaneously minimize the overall retention cost for the Navy? 
D. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this project is to investigate the potential retention and cost 
impacts of combination of retention base incentives the Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) 
community.  It will begin with the accession of Surface Warfare Officers, SWOCP 
history, and an assessment of factors leading to low retention in the Surface Warfare 
Officer community.  The authors designed and administered a survey to a portion of the 
fleet, to determine other factors for lateral transfers to other communities and resignations 
from the SWO community.  The survey will also introduce the theory of multiple 
attribute auctions, in combination with SWOCP, to determine the value a junior officer 
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places on homeport, ship class, and billet.  We completed a review of the latest Surface 
Warfare Officer Vital Signs to determine the current number of department heads that 
have accepted SWOCP.  A review of age, ethnicity, commissioning source, homeport 
location, and number of dependents will be completed to determine if these variables 
have a direct effect on retention.   
The methodology for this MBA project will be a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative data.  Our data collection method will consist of the following methods: 
• Distribute a survey to NPS students and the fleet. 
• Collect data from the work-life balance conference held at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
• Obtain data from PERS-41 concerning the current state of the SWOCP 
contracts accepted by specific year groups. 
• Perform a statistical analysis of age, ethnicity, years of service, 
commissioning source, number of dependents and rank. 
• Reviewing the monetary amounts that survey respondents indicated in 
their responses. 
The survey was first conducted on Surface Warfare Officers currently attending 
the Naval Postgraduate School Surface.  The survey was then distributed to navy ships 
around the world.  We believe that our survey revealed that Surface Warfare Officers 
place a high value on their ability to choose their particular ship type, homeport, and 
billet.  Our survey consisted of 18 questions, and was estimated to take approximately 15 
minutes to complete.  The primary target groups for the survey are those Surface Warfare 
Officers who have or have not completed their initial division officer tours and have not 
yet signed a contract accepting SWOCP or submitted a request for resignation from 
active duty. In the design of our survey we included basic demographic questions such as 
ethnicity, commissioning source, number of dependents, and the highest level of 
education completed.    
Our choice to administer a web based survey using Survey Monkey was based on 
the benefits derived from using such a survey method.  This survey method provides a 
variety of benefits although not without some corresponding drawbacks.1  In our case, 
                                                 
1 Reynolds &Rodney A, 2007. 
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based on the geographical dispersion of our sample audience and their corresponding 
relative ease of access to the internet (in most cases) this survey method proved to be the 





Web-based • Turnaround time (quick delivery 
and easy return) 
• Ease of reaching large number 
of potential respondents 
• Can use multiple question 
formats 
• Data quality checking 
• Ease of ensuring confidentiality 
• Can provide customized delivery 
of items 
• Can capture data directly in 
database 
• Time-consuming development 
• Potential for limited access 
within target population 
• Potential for technology 
problems to decrease return rate 
• Security issues may threaten 
validity or decrease return rate 
• Lack of control over sample 
• Potential for bias in sample 
 
Table 1.   Web-based survey pros and cons 
Source: From Handbook of Research on Electronic Surveys and Measurements 
 
Survey Monkey is a licensed survey web engine utilized by the Naval Post-graduate 
School.  The survey was distributed, collected, and completed anonymously as follows to 
the designated groups: 
 
Sample Group Survey Open Date Survey Close Date 
• NPS Students 
• Junior SWOS afloat 
 
• 26 JUL 2007 
• 13 AUG 2007 
 
• 10 AUG 2007 
• 25 AUG 2007 
Table 2.   Web-based survey open/close dates 
 
The survey was distributed to the Naval Postgraduate School Surface Warfare 
Officers during the summer quarter of academic year 2007 via email.  These officers 
were given two weeks to complete the survey, with a reminder email sent at the end of 
the first week, and two days prior to the survey deadline.  The survey was also distributed 
to junior SWOs serving on ships throughout the fleet. In both cases the survey audience 
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was notified of the survey via email.  The students at NPS were requested to take the 
survey via the senior SWO on campus.  For the afloat units, emails were sent by 
Professor Gates, Associate Dean for Research in the Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School, in coordination with our project team, to 
110 Commanding Officers serving on afloat units.  The ships chosen for the survey were 
platforms on which typical junior SWOs serve for their first and second Division Officer 
tours.  Ship types included: Frigates (FFG), Destroyers (DDG), Cruisers (CG), Dock 
Landing Platforms (LPD), and Dock Landing Ships (LSD). They are located throughout a 
variety of fleet concentration and deployed locations to include Norfolk, San Diego, 
Yokosuka, Bahrain, Jacksonville, Pearl Harbor and Everett.  Commanding Officers were 
asked to distribute the survey information to their junior officers however; they 
themselves would have no visibility over the individual responses of the officers under 
their command.   It was noted in the survey that participants would be allowed to view 
the results upon the completion of the survey research.   
To analyze the data, we used Microsoft Excel to create spreadsheets that will 
capture ethnicity, number of dependents, commissioning source, and education 
completion level.  We used the values assigned to answer questions 14-18 to determine 
the amount of monetary value that Surface Warfare Officers place on homeport, billet, 
and ship type.  We then built a model based on the survey results to place a dollar value 
on ship type, billet, and homeport.  We included the quality of life question responses in 
our further research section of the project. 
E. MOTIVATION 
Maintaining sufficient numbers of highly trained and highly motivated military 
officers across all branches of service remains of utmost importance to ensure the 
continued prosecution of the present Global War on Terrorism.  Longer and more 
frequent deployments along with the steadily increasing death toll updates on the nightly 
news serve as grim reminders of how dangerous and difficult filling the ranks of military 
officers has become.  In addition to the growing operations tempo, the services have had 
to battle with corporate America for the limited supply of talent available in the 
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workplace.  A comment by Vice Admiral Ryan to the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee highlighted the growing challenges of competing with the commercial 
sector for the best and brightest: 
Today’s recruiting and retention atmosphere can be best described as 
war… a sustained engagement to recruit and retain the very best men and 
women this nation has to offer.2 
 
The U.S. military is not alone in the fight to recruit and retain skilled personnel.  
One private-sector survey found that 65 percent of human resource executives listed 
recruitment, selection and placement among their top three priorities in 2000.  A follow-
on survey found that 72 percent of HR professionals were concerned about recruitment 
and retention. In highly technical fields, such as Information Technology and 
Engineering, companies are especially vulnerable to a limited pool of qualified 
employees.  Some outside observers have even suggested that the military’s recruitment 
and retention problems stem from its inability to compete with the pay and benefit 
offerings of private sector companies.3  
The U.S. military can be thought of as a large employer not unlike those found in 
the private sector.  It competes for talent externally with the private sector and also 
internally between each of the branches of service. In many ways it is subject to the same 
labor opportunities and constraints facing large private sector companies.   The Navy’s 
enlisted ranks, for example, are comparable in size to IBM’s global workforce.4 Both 
private and public institutions are facing the same struggle to recruit and retain high 
quality employees. 
To recruit this new generation of college graduates, often referred to as 
“generation Y,” many private-sector companies often shower them with large salaries, 
bonuses, and in many cases promises of a flexible work schedule and benefits that can be 
custom tailored to each prospective employee’s needs. Companies such as Ernst & 
                                                 
2 CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA & Hattiangadi, 2001. 
3 CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA & Hattiangadi, 2001.  
4 CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA & Hattiangadi, 2001. 
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Young, for example, have adjusted their recruiting methods, using Facebook and 
Craigslist to actively engage this next generation workforce.5  All this increased 
competition for a shrinking labor market coupled with the increasing danger and 
workloads imposed upon military officers has forced the military services to rethink the 
means by which they intend to recruit,  train and reward future military officers.  From 
past studies conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School, it is clear that this new 
generation of junior officers is looking for more than just financial incentives to recruit 
and retain them.  They want the ability to choose between a variety of incentives both 
monetary and non-monetary. The Navy is only just now beginning to recognize this fact 
and is struggling to come up with solutions to adequately address the retention concerns 
at hand. 
                                                 
5 U.S. Navy 2007. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Department of Defense has experienced a period of significant downsizing 
service since the end of the Cold War era.  Much of this force reduction occurred in the 
1990’s as the Administration tried to capitalize on the “peace dividend.” This reduction in 
force included equipment as well as personnel, including both officers and enlisted.  
Without any significant consideration of future conflicts, the services reduced their 
capabilities across the board.  Since September 11, 2001, however, there has been an 
increasing demand for personnel to fill the voids left behind in the all volunteer force.  
The commitments of the U.S. in Iraq, Afghanistan and other hot spots around the world 
have stretched the capabilities of the military services to their very limits.  More than 
ever, maintaining the proper quantity and quality of military officers remains paramount 
to the nation’s safety and security.   
With the transition to an all volunteer military force in 1973, the military services 
have dedicated significant resources to recruit, train, and maintain the military force of 
the future.  The decision of today’s senior military leaders with regards to recruitment 
and retention will have a significant impact upon the future decisions of young college 
graduates to become military officers. The continuous availability of experienced, skilled 
and highly motivated military officers is paramount to maintaining the safety and security 
of the United States and its Allies.  Without the sufficient quantity and quality of military 
officers, the United States faces the real possibility of not being able to meet the current 
as well as future needs of the Global War on Terror and any future conflicts that remain 
unseen as of yet.  
1. Officer Corps 
The officer corps of the military serves as the leaders of the all volunteer force.  
They are the ones ultimately responsible for recruiting, training and ensuring their 
personnel remain ready to go into harms way.  Without military officers, the nation’s 
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military forces would cease to exist. 6  Officers serve in the four primary branches of 
military service to include the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and are accessed from 
a variety of sources coming from a variety of backgrounds including; engineering, 
medicine, law, business and the sciences.  The military services have traditionally used 
three primary programs to award commissions to future military officers.  These 
programs include the military academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and 
Officer Candidate/Training School (OCS/OTS).7   
2. Officer Accession Sources 
The military academies include The U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval 
Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy.  Each offer four year undergraduate 
programs that provide Bachelor Degrees to all officer candidates upon completion, 
ensuring their commissioning as military officers in their selected service.  In addition to 
a rigorous academic schedule, the officer candidates are subjected to intense military 
specific training as well as physical fitness training.  Graduates of the service academies 
are required to serve on active duty for a period of five years after commissioning.8  
The Navy’s military academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, founded in 1845, is 
located in Annapolis Maryland.  Students with a strong desire to attend are subject to a 
rigorous selection process with only approximately about 10% of applicants being 
accepted.  In 2002, only 1214 of the 12,333 applicants were accepted for admission.  
Upon acceptance into the U.S. Naval Academy, students receive free tuition, room and 
board as well as books. Graduates from the Naval Academy can choose among 18 
possible majors and upon graduation earn a commission in the U.S. Navy or Marine 
Corps.9  The Naval Academy is the second largest source of Surface Warfare Officers 
(SWOs).10 
                                                 
6 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
7 United States Government Accountability Office, 2007. 
8 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
9 USNA website.. 
10 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
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Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) – The military service ROTC units are 
located at civilian undergraduate institutions throughout the country.  As of January 2007, 
the Army had ROTC units located at 273 academic institutions, the Navy at 71 
institutions and the Air Force at 144 institutions.11  Students who are awarded ROTC 
scholarships receive full tuition along with room and board.  They receive the same 
academic instruction as their civilian classmates; however, they are also required to 
complete military specific training.  Upon graduation, these officer candidates receive 
commissions which require them to commit to four years of active duty service.12 
Navy ROTC – The Navy’s Reserve Officer Training Corps was founded in 1926.  
To receive a NROTC scholarship, students must complete a rigorous application and 
interview process and achieve acceptable scores on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT).  
Like other ROTC scholarship programs, the NROTC program provides students serving 
in ROTC, also known as midshipmen, with full tuition reimbursement for their selected 
college or university, along with a stipend for books, food and uniforms.  Once an 
applicant is enrolled in the NROTC program, they are taught the basic principles of 
military bearing, leadership, drill and seamanship.  These students are required to take 
courses in naval science each semester which cover a broad array of topics, to include: 
naval history, navigation, ethics and leadership.  Upon successful completion of their 
university and NROTC requirements, these midshipmen graduate and are commissioned 
as Ensigns in the U.S. Navy.  Once midshipmen accept their commissions, they are 
obligated to serve on military active duty for a period of four years and reserve military 
duty for an additional four years, for a total of eight years of service.13  The Navy’s 
ROTC program is the largest accession source for Surface Warfare Officers.  In 2007 
alone, the NROTC program provided 290 SWOs to the fleet.14   
Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) and Officer Training Schools (OTS) are the 
third primary accession tool for the military services.  These programs are primarily 
                                                 
11 United States Government Accountability Office, 2007. 
12 Military.com ROTC website.. 
13 NROTC-history.. 
14 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
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aimed at college graduates who wish to obtain commissions in a selected branch of 
service.  Typically these programs focus on basic military training and can range from as 
short as 6 weeks for the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program to 14 weeks 
for the Army Officer Candidate School.15  The services have traditionally relied more 
heavily upon the military service academies and the ROTC programs for new officer 
accessions.  When these programs failed to meet their assigned quotas, however, the 
OCS/OTS programs have been used to make up for any shortfall in accession numbers.  
OCS provided 92 SWOs to the fleet in 2007. 
The Navy’s Officer Candidate School is located in Pensacola, Florida and 
provides 13 weeks of officer candidate indoctrination and training.  Most of the 
applicants who attend OCS already hold a Bachelor’s degree, typically in a Business or 
Science related field of study.  The course of study while at OCS is intense and includes 
classes on the naval sciences; it is accompanied by arduous physical fitness and drill 
programs.  Successful completion of OCS is rewarded with a commission as a naval 
officer for a required minimum period of 4 years active duty.   
STA-21 - The Seaman to Admiral Program, now known widely as STA-21, was 
re-instated in 1994.  The program was designed for enlisted navy men and women to earn 
commissions in the U.S. Navy and serve the balance of their careers as naval officers.  To 
apply for the STA-21 program, applicants must already possess at least an Associates 
degree from an accredited college or university.  Once an applicant is accepted into the 
program they attend OCS and, once completed, receive their commission as Naval 
Officers in the U.S. Navy. They must serve for a period of 4 years.16 109 SWOs were 
commissioned through the STA-21 program.17 
LDO Program – The Limited Duty Officer program is an enlisted to officer 
program that the Navy uses to retain their most technically capable sailors.  The program 
does not require a college degree.  LDOs usually serve for a period of eight years as an 
                                                 
15 United States Government Accountability Office, 2007. 
16 Seaman to admiral-21. 
17 Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC Naval Message, Subject: SWO Continuation Pay, 
181759Z OCT 99. 
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enlisted sailor and then serve out the remainder of their careers as commissioned officers, 
typically until they retire from active duty.18   
3. Naval Surface Warfare Community 
Navy Surface Warfare – Surface Warfare is the Navy community that uses 
surface ships for the missions of forward naval presence, sea control and projection of 
power ashore. The Surface Warfare community is the oldest community in the Navy and 
today comprises just over 8,000 officers.19 Surface Warfare Officers are those naval 
officers whose primary duties focus on the operation of surface ships at sea, including  
managing all the onboard systems and personnel.  Surface Warfare Officers are the “ship 
drivers” of the fleet. It is their job to lead the ship into harms way when so directed by 
higher authority.  The pinnacle of a Surface Warfare Officer’s career path would typically 
be to command a ship at sea.  Those that aspire to such great heights of leadership must 
pass through a variety of challenging career milestones that serve to train and prepare 
them for such an enormous responsibility.   
Like all other naval officers, the Surface Warfare Officer typically comes into the 
Navy with a four year college degree. Most of these junior Surface Warfare Officers go 
directly to sea after graduating from their undergraduate institutions, serving their first 
tour division officer job when they arrive.  The primary goals of Surface Warfare division 
officers are to learn their jobs to the best of their ability and develop their leadership 
skills by being placed in charge of a particular shipboard division.  The SWO division 
officer tours are designed to provide the hands on training and development necessary for 
the new officers entering the fleet. Division officer tours are typically 24 and 18 months 
for 1st and 2nd division officer tours, respectively. These two tours are typically split 
between different ship types.  The first division officer tour lasts approximately 24 
months and its primary goal is to have the Junior Surface Warfare Officers qualify in a 
variety of areas, most importantly becoming qualified as Officer of the Deck (OOD) 
 
                                                 
18 LDO/CWO community. 
19 Graham & Naval Postgraduate School, U.S., 2006. 
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underway and achieving sufficient expertise in their career field to become Surface 
Warfare Officer (SWO) qualified, enabling them to wear the Surface Warfare Officer 
breast insignia.   
 
Figure 1.   Surface Warfare Officer Breast Insignia 
 
The “SWO pin,” created in 1975 is awarded to those SWOs who have shown the 
requisite knowledge and expertise in their fields.  During this initial division officer sea 
tour, officers are typically assigned a variety of jobs within multiple shipboard 
departments.  This variety provides the junior SWO with a highly diversified background 
from which they become familiar with all onboard systems and personnel. This broad 
background is key for junior officers in achieving their qualifications as Surface Warfare 
Officers.  During this initial sea tour, junior officers must develop a familiarity with 
seamanship, leadership, and initial war fighting skills.20  Completion of this first division 
officer tour afloat will be followed by a second tour afloat as a division officer but with 
increasing levels of leadership and responsibility required.   
The typical second tour for the junior Surface Warfare Officers sees them being 
transferred to another ship platform or they can choose to “fleet up” on their current 
platform into a second tour division officer job. Either way, the second tour jobs will 
have the officers serve in positions different than those of their first tours.  A second tour 
division officer job typically lasts about 18 months and will have junior officers serve in 
jobs requiring greater amounts of expertise and responsibility.  Typical second tour jobs 
might include: Navigator, Training Officer, or Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA) 
depending on the type of platform on which they are serving.  These second tour jobs 
allow the junior officers to obtain additional qualifications, such as Engineering Officer 
of the Watch (EOOW) and Tactical Action Officer (TAO).  In addition, their in-port 
                                                 
20 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
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responsibilities grow to include becoming Command Duty Officer (CDO) qualified and 
possibly Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) qualified.  Overall, second tour division officer 
jobs, allow junior officers to specialize in a particular job specialty and provides them 
with a more diversified background.   
Surface Warfare Officers have the chance to serve in a variety of locations around 
the world.  Most of their first and second tour assignments however are in a major fleet 
concentration area, such as Norfolk, VA; San Diego, CA; Bremerton, WA; Mayport, FL; 
Pearl Harbor, HI; and Yokosuka, Japan.  Upon successfully completing their two afloat 
division officer tours, they have the opportunity to rotate to shore duty and pursue a 
variety of interests, which may include pursuing a graduate degree, working in a staff 
position or working as a recruiter.  This time ashore is designed to further broaden the 
experience of young SWOs as well as provide them additional education and training as 
they prepare to return to the fleet as Department Heads afloat.   
Today, the Navy’s primary concern with the Surface Warfare Officer community 
is how to continue to retain the necessary quality and quantity of officers past their initial 
obligations to ensure there are sufficient Surface Warfare Officers available to fill all the 
Department Head jobs that exists across the fleet.  Typically, a junior SWO reaches the 
end of their initial obligated service period while on their second afloat division officer 
tour or at the latest on their first shore tour.  Most of these officers must make critical 
career decisions on whether to stay in the navy or look for a career in the civilian sector.  
Many decide to get out of the navy at this point; others may try to make a lateral transfer 
to another community, while some decide to continue in their SWO career path.   
During the past 10 years, the Navy has faced a shortage of Surface Warfare 
Officers at the Department Head Level. To increase the SWO retention rate into their 
Department Head Tours, the Navy implemented the Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP), a special pay designed to incentivize those personnel 
eligible to pursue their SWO careers as afloat Department Heads.  Upon acceptance of 
the SWOCP, the officers must commit to completing department head school followed 
by two back to back 18 month department head tours afloat.   
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4. History of SWOCP  
The Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP) was officially 
established in January 2000.  Often referred to as the “SWO bonus,” it was designed 
primarily to keep all afloat department head billets filled by enticing junior officers who 
might otherwise have decided to leave the navy prior to their department head tours.  In 
addition, it served to increase overall retention rates and reduce the overall costs of the 
SWO community by limiting the number of new SWO accessions required to make up 
for the shortfall at the SWO department head level.21  Other communities within the 
Navy have traditionally received bonuses as well.  These bonuses are also awarded to 
ensure the Navy retains the skilled manpower in critical career fields, such as doctors, 
dentists, aviators, flight officers and nuclear officers.  In all, these bonuses serve the same 
overall purpose: to retain personnel with critical skills to serve past their initial 
obligations.  22 
The Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay became available upon the 
enactment of the FY-00 Department of Defense Appropriation Bill.  SWOCP is an 
incentive pay, paying up to a total of $50,000 for completion of two afloat department 
head tours.  SWOCP contracts terminate at the completion of the two department head 
tours or one single long department head tour.  SWOCP obligation runs concurrent with 
any other obligated service applicable to that officer, with the exception of the officer’s 
original commissioning source.  The Chief of Naval Personnel has been delegated the 
authority to determine the eligibility of applicants, accept SWOCP contracts, and manage 
the SWOCP program.   
5. Eligibility Requirements 
To be eligible for the Surface Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP), 
officers must meet the following criteria: 
                                                 
21 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 2006. 
22 Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC Naval Message, Subject: SWO Continuation Pay, 
181759Z OCT 99. 
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• Have earned their Surface Warfare Officer qualification or be currently 
serving as a designated Surface Warfare Officer.  Surface Warfare officer 
designations are 1165, 1115, and 1110. 
• Been recommended for and screened for department head tours by a 
PERS-41 screening board. 
• Complete all obligated service commitment incurred through the officer’s 
original commissioning source. 
• Maintain the ability to complete two department head tours or one single 
long department head tour as assigned by PERS-41. 
• Apply to receive SWOCP prior to graduation from department head 
school. 
Officers who are in the Naval Reserve but serving on active duty who meet the criteria 
are also eligible to apply for SWOCP.  Officers who have submitted resignation letters 
must withdraw their resignation request prior to being considered for SWOCP.  Officers 
who are receiving SWOCP may not lateral transfer to another community until 
completion of the Department Head minimum tour length requirement; however, they 
may apply and be accepted for lateral transfer without penalty. 
6. Payment Scheme 
Once the SWOCP contract has been approved by PERS-41, officers are eligible to 
receive their first 10,000 dollar installment upon contract acceptance.  At the onset of DH 
school or start of their first department head tour, officers will receive their second 
10,000 dollar installment. The remaining three installments will be paid on the 
anniversary date of their department head school report date. 
7. Recoupment 
 If an officer fails to maintain eligibility for SWOCP, fails to complete the required 
tour length or obligated service, then no further SWOCP payments will be made.  The 
situations which require bonus recoupment are listed below: 
• Approved request for voluntary release from written agreement, due to 
unusual circumstances.  Navy Personnel Command will determine if it is 
in the best interest of both parties to grant such a release. 
• Approved voluntary request for relief. 
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• Refusal to accept orders to a department head billet. 
• Disability resulting from misconduct, willful neglect, or incurred during a 
period of unauthorized absence. 
• Separation for cause, including misconduct. 
• Approved detachment for cause. 
• Failure to complete department head school. 
• Separation by reason of weight control or physical readiness test failure. 
In the following situations, no further payments will be made but past payments will not 
be recouped: 
• Disability not as a result of misconduct, willful neglect, or not incurred 
during a period of unauthorized absence. 
• Separation from Naval service by operations of laws or regulations 
independent of misconduct. 
• Navy Personnel Command deems the waiver of payments is in the best 
interests of the United States. 
If an officer under a SWOCP contract dies prior to receiving the full bonus due, the 
remaining unpaid balance is payable as a lump sum for inclusion in settlement of 
deceased officer’s final military pay account. 
8. Junior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus (JR 
SWO CSRB) 
The Junior Surface Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus was designed to 
compensate sailors for completing highly demanding jobs and in an effort to improve 
retention amongst Surface Warfare Officers.  The Navy faced competition from the 
civilian sector and job placement agencies such as Lucas group.  The bonus is a career 
incentive, and pays eligible lieutenants 25,000 dollars to stay in the Navy and Surface 
Warfare Community through the ninth year of commissioned service and completion of 
two department head tours.  To qualify for the JR SWO CSRB officers must have an 
approved SWOCP contract on file.  23 JR SWO CSRB and SWOCP are paid from 
separate budgetary accounts. 
                                                 
23 Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC Naval Message, Subject: Junior Surface Warfare 
Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus. 
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Past research has uncovered a variety of reasons for low retention rates in the 
Surface Warfare Officer community.   Part of the ongoing retention problem arises from 
the challenges associated with the overall SWO career path.  A large portion of a SWOs 
career involves extended time at sea, either conducting training exercises or deploying to 
hot spots overseas.  Typically, most of this sea time occurs at the beginning of their 
careers from their initial tours as division officers through their Department Head Tours.  
Sea time during this period can include up to seven years. 24   The figure below delineates 
the typical SWO career path through their Department Head tours.  
SWO Initial Career Path 
 
 
Figure 2.   SWO Initial Career Path (From RAND) 
 
As noted by several retention studies in recent years, this extended time at sea has 
become a key factor for officers who decide to leave the Navy after completing their 
initial obligation.  This single factor alone, however, does not adequately capture the 
majority of reasons why SWOs decide to leave their jobs. 
In 2006, research conducted by Sharon Graham at the Naval Postgraduate School 
identified a multitude of reasons why SWOs were leaving their jobs in such large 
numbers.  Some of the reasons given by the participants (both male and female) in her 
survey included; lack of confidence in senior leadership, lack of passion for the job, 
inability to achieve a proper work/life balance and excessive work hours. For the female 
survey participants, family planning was a crucial factor in their decisions to leave the 
SWO community.  In many cases, as Graham’s thesis noted, the SWOCP alone was 
insufficient to retain many of these highly qualified officers in their communities.  Even 
with the SWOCP, many still sought to make lateral transfers while others opted to 
                                                 
24 RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INST SANTA MONICA CA, Yardley, Thie, 
Brancato, & Abbott, 2004. 
Years of Service 
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terminate their navy careers altogether.  Graham conducted interviews, which showed 
very clearly that the SWOCP alone was not going to solve the SWO Department Head 
retention issues that the Navy currently faces.  Many of Graham’s survey participants 
commented loud and clear on how money was not the primary motivator for their 
continued service as a SWO. One survey participant was quoted as saying: 
 
They could take SWOCP and double it.  It wouldn’t keep me around.  It’s 
not the money.  It’s the job satisfaction. (male SWO)25 
 
This theme has been echoed time and time again in a variety of studies, including 
those conducted at the University of San Diego by Wahl and Singh.26  In their study, 
they found that job satisfaction, retirement benefits and educational opportunities were 
most important to their survey participants. Of the 14 statements provided in their survey, 
the influence of the SWOCP ranked between fifth and eighth.  Each of the studies 
conducted above has continued to reemphasize the fact that people are motivated at a 
variety of levels and by a variety of incentives based on their unique individual needs and 
desires. The Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) Quick Poll in 2004 recorded these same 
findings when asking about SWOCP’s influence on retaining SWOs. 
 
                                                 
25 Graham & Naval Postgraduate School U.S., 2006. 
26 Wahl & Singh, 2006. 
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Figure 3.   SWOCP as a SWO motivator (From 2004 CNP Quick Poll) 
 
When asked about the impact of SWOCP as a motivator, results were split across 
gender lines with only 26% of females believing SWOCP was a positive motivator 
compared to 43% of their male counterparts.  Even more telling is the response to how 
effective a monetary bonus is in motivating a SWO to remain on active duty.  Forty 
percent of the Male SWOs said that a monetary bonus is no motivator at all, while this 
number ballooned up to 60% for SWO females.    
The same quick poll examined the possible use of geographic stability as a 
motivator to retention.  The results indicated that more than half of the SWOs surveyed 
indicated that it was, with 67% of the males favoring geographic stability as a positive 
motivator compared to 62% for their female counterparts.   
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Figure 4.   Geographic Stability as a SWO Motivator    (From 2004 CNP Quick 
Poll) 
 
The challenge for the Navy remains to adapt to the desires of the next generation 
workforce or face what will become a huge “brain drain” of talent out of naval service. 
The Graham study uncovered some possible future incentives, both monetary and 
non-monetary, that the Navy may choose to adopt if it is serious about closing the 
retention gap in the Surface Warfare Community.   In addition to the SWOCP, other 
incentives identified through Graham’s interviews included the possibility of taking a 
sabbatical/leave of absence from the job, the guarantee of a lateral transfer, allowing 
career flexibility, geographic stability and guaranteed graduate education.   
This project will examine the possibility of implementing an officer driven choice 
based incentive package whereby officers can choose among a variety of incentives, to 
include SWOCP, choice of homeport, choice of billet, and choice of ship platform.   
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III. SURVEY RESULTS 
A. RESPONSE RATES 
In trying to determine survey response rates, the authors were unable to identify 
the exact numbers of officers in each of the sample sizes. The response rate is the 
proportion of all people who were selected who completed the survey.27  For NPS SWO 
students, we were not able to identify how many lateral transfers from the SWO 
community were in attendance at NPS.  Some may or may not have received the survey.  
For our survey to the junior shipboard SWOs, we were unable to determine just how 
many officers were onboard each ship that fit our eligibility criteria for survey 
completion (O-3 and below who have not yet signed on for  SWOCP).  Due to known 
correlation between ship type and wardroom size, we estimated what our approximate 
sample size would be in order to calculate a response rate. 
 









NPS SWO Students 180 53 29 % 
Junior SWOs afloat 1200 260 22 % 
Totals 1380 313 23% 
Table 3.   NPS and Fleet Survey Results Total 
 
The Central Limit Theorem states that for any sample size where n ≥ 30, where n 
represents the sample size of the population in question, we can accurately use our 
findings to make predictions about the population.28  In this project, because we have 
sample sizes equal to or greater than 30 in both instances, with NPS students totaling 53 
                                                 
27 Keller,Gerald 2005. 
28 Keller,Gerald 2005. 
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and SWOs afloat totaling 260, then in both cases we are able to make statistically 
acceptable predictions about the population. 
The junior officer afloat survey was emailed to 110 Commodores, Commanding 
Officers, and Executive Officers onboard ships worldwide on 13 August 2007.  By 27 
August 2007, the cutoff date for tabulating results, 319 responses were received.  No 
reminder notice was placed on the survey.  The Commanding Officers of USS Port 
Royal, USS Ford, USS The Sullivans, and USS Germantown personally responded to the 
authors regarding the distribution of the survey to their junior officers.  This was very 
significant for the reliability of the survey. All respondent identification codes, internet 
protocol (IP) addresses, and privacy act data was eliminated from the fleet responses to 
prevent comprising a respondent’s identity.  The target audience of the fleet survey 
indicated via email was lieutenants (O3) and below who had not yet accepted the 
SWOCP bonus and occupy the billets listed in the chart below. 
 
PLATFORM DESIGNATED 2ND TOUR BILLETS 
APSLANT TLAM PLANNER 
APSPAC TLAM PLANNER 
AS NAV 
CDS STAFF 
CG52-73 NAV, DCA, FCO, MPA, TRNG 
CPG PHIB OPS 
CPR STAFF 
CV63 
DIV WEPS, 1LT(3), FCO, AUX(2), BOILER GEN, SHIP ELEC 
(2), ADCA 
CV67 
NTDS-CIC (2), 1LT (2), DIV WEPS, SHP ELC, ADCA, AUX 
MACH 
CVN65 DIV WEPS**, SHP ELX MTL, FCO, NTDS-CIC, CMS, 1LT 
CVN68 DIV WEPS, 1LT(3), E DIVO, AUX 
CVN69 NTDS-CIC, 1LT, DIV WEPS, E DIVO, AUX 
CVN70 NTDS-CIC, 1LT, DIV WEPS, E DIVO, AUX 
CVN71-77 NTDS-CIC, 1LT, E DIVO, AUX 
DDG51 NAV, DCA, FCO, TRNG 
ESG STAFF (2) 
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EXPEDRIVRON COAST/HARBOR DEFENSE 
FFG NAV, DCA, AUX, TRNG 
HSV OPS 
IBU XO, FPO 
LCC ACICO 
LHA WEP, AUX 
LHD FCO, AUX, WEPS 
LPD CICO, NAV, TRNG, R-DIVO 
LSD41 NAV, TRNG, MPA, CICO 
MCM OPS 
MCMDIV (Japan and 
Bahrain) 
OPS, READINESS 
MCMRON OPS, READINESS-SKEDS, FPO 
MEF NGLO 
MHC OPS 
MIUW COAST/HARBOR DEFENSE, STF MTL 
MSC APSRON FPO, OPS 
MSF DET OPS 
NAV BCH GRU STF REDI PHIB 
PC OPS, WEPS 
XCRAFT OPS 
** DIV WEPS: CVN 65/68/69/70 
 
 
Table 4.   Second Tour Div Officer Billets (From the PERS 412 website) 
 
The survey consisted of 18 questions and is attached as Appendix D.  Most of the 
questions were multiple choice questions, with several open ended questions to gauge 
junior officer opinion of the current incentives and the possibility of new incentives that 
the Surface Warfare Officer community may offer to improve retention.  The open ended 
questions were intended to give the Junior Officers (JO) an opportunity to express their 
opinions, suggestions, and concerns.  The response rate for each question is listed in 
Appendix E.    
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There was a very negative tone to the survey responses.  The open ended 
responses spoke very negatively of the Surface Warfare Officer Community and seemed 
to be emotionally driven.  These answers more importantly indicated that junior officers 
feel the community has significant problems in addition to retention problems. 
There was a limited amount of positive responses concerning SWOCP.  However 
the positive responses indicated junior officers enjoy port visits, leading sailors, and the 
current SWOCP incentive.  The top five satisfiers for the Surface Warfare Community 
are listed below with a quote from an anonymous survey respondent in each case: 
• Graduate Education 
Additional or improved educational opportunities would be worth 
forfeiting some amount of the bonus (dependant upon the nature and 
incentive of the educational program) 
 
• Housing 
Guaranteed Base Housing - 5000 Money for dependents education – 
10000 
• Leave Sabbatical 
2 year sabbatical so you can earn a Masters Degree using your own money 
(10000). 
 
• Geographical Stability 
Just because I am not putting a dollar amount on these items doesn't make 
them any less meaningful. A guaranteed homeport, billet and ship type 
would be a great trade on a bonus all together. A parking spot would be 
great, an increase in OHA/BAH would be great, geographical stability 
would be fantastic. 
 
• Telecommuting 
The telecommuting idea is huge. This is the way (as I am sure you know) 
that the corporate world is heading and I think the Navy should follow as 
much as possible. Many of the officers in our wardroom have been talking 
this over and we all agree that it would certainly improve our QOL and 
make it easier to agree to stay on. We have even been discussing the fact 
that we would agree to lower salaries in exchange for working from home 
when not deployed. I think telecommuting is the most exciting idea I have 
heard WRT the SWO community, and it would probably sway me to agree 
to do two DH rides. 
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The negative responses indicated that junior officers were unsatisfied with senior 
leadership, family separation, working hours, and work load.  The most troubling results 
of the survey indicate that junior officers feel if they take a sabbatical, have children, or 
lack operational experience then they will fall behind their peers and not get selected for 
promotion.  Female officers highlighted the inability to get married and have children 
while being a Surface Warfare Officer.  The survey also revealed that the SWOCP bonus, 
may not be enough for the Surface Warfare Officer community to continue to reach its 
goal of 275 department heads annually.  The top five dissatisfiers for the Surface Warfare 
Community are listed below along with a quote from one of the survey respondents: 
• Family Separation 
A limit on the amount of time a ship can spend out to sea in a given 
calendar year - this alone would overshadow any offers of sabbatical or 
geographical stability. Right now I see it as simply impossible to have a 
'normal' family life in which I have an active role in my children’s' lives 
when I spend the majority of the 365 day year away from them. A 
sabbatical would be great, but once it is over, then I would be back to 
again rarely seeing my family. I have seen too many family problems 
develop as a direct result of service member's large amount of time spent 
on the ship instead of with their children or spouse. I know the Navy is not 
going to decrease underway time any time soon, and this is my reason for 
getting out of the Navy after my 4 year commitment is over. 
 
• Workload 
I would not give up any amount of money because I see what the 
department heads go through and no matter where you are at or what you 
are doing, the job is going to stink. You are going to be putting in super 
long hours and never get anything done. Why would I want any other 
incentives, it won't make it any better, since you are going to spend all 
your time on the ship anyway. You might as well let your family stay at 
your previous duty station, you are not going to get to see them anyway. 
Until being a department head is viewed as an achievement, you are going 
to always have problems getting Junior Officers to stay in. From our point 
of view right now, the Navy is so desperate to keep Department Heads that 
officers who really shouldn't be department heads are becoming 
department heads and just making it worse for the departments, officers, 
and sailors they attempt to lead. I don't know how many times in my 
career that I have been told that a family wasn't issued to me in my sea 
bag. Until this mentality changes the Navy will not be a career for me 




I would be more than happy to continue in the Navy if I could come home 
to my family every night, and if I had bosses that were reasonable people 
that talked to their subordinates like humans and not machines. - I would 
give up the entire bonus for this. 
 
• Poor Command Climate 
No amount of money would convince me to stay in the Navy. My decision 
to leave is based on the disappointment I have developed with the 
organization. We do not take care of our people. We do not train ourselves 
appropriately. We are too focused on quantity and not quality. Given I 
have a master degree in engineering, there is not much that the Navy can 
offer me. I joined the organization because I thought it was committed to 
more. I want to be part of something “bigger” that myself and something I 
could be proud off. I did not join the military for the money. Seeing as the 
Navy is not offering true honor courage and commitment, I do to feel that 
I am being true to myself by remaining part of an organization that I do 
not believe. 
 
• Individual Augmentation Billet (IA) 
One major incentive that does not have a monetary amount is to make IA's 
a sea tour billet. 
 
The survey contained questions concerning the current SWOCP bonus and the 
possibility of having the ability to decide your homeport, billet, and ship type.  The 
responses indicated that SWOCP is a determining factor in retention, but more junior 
officers would like the opportunity to choose their homeport, billet, and ship type vice 
being slated by the detailer.  Junior Officers did not necessarily indicate that they would 
take less money to have a definite homeport, billet, and ship type of their choice.  There 
were no significant differences between Atlantic and Pacific coast respondents.  
1. Fleet Survey Results  
 
 Question #1: I agree to participate in this survey? 
 
 All participants agreed to participate in the survey. 
 















Figure 5.   Fleet Marital Status.  44% of the fleet Surface Warfare Officers were 
married, 40% were single, 10% were married to other military 
















Figure 6.   Survey revealed that 67% of fleet dependents have 0 dependents, 22% 
have 1-2 dependents, 10% have 3-4 dependents, and 1% have 5 or more 
dependents. 
 















Figure 7.   Fleet Commissioning Source.  48% were commissioned through the 
NROTC program, 31% were commissioned via the STA-21 program, 
13% were commissioned via USNA, 5% were commissioned via OCS, 
and 3% were commissioned via the LDO program. 
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Figure 8.   Current paygrade of fleet Surface Warfare Officers.  37% of 
respondents were O-2, 28% were O-1, 15% were O-3, 7% were O-2E, 
6% were O-4, and 4% were O-1E. 
 
 Question #6: Where are you currently serving?  
 
 All participants are currently serving onboard ships throughout the Navy. 
 











COMTHIRDFLT   (San
Diego/Everett/Pearl)
COMFIFTHFLT   (Bahrain)




Figure 9.   Survey response by fleet homeport.  35% of responses were received 
from the COMSEVENTHFLT AOR, 34% were received from 
COMSECONDFLT, 30% were received from COMTHIRDFLT and 
1% from COMFIFTHFLT. 
 
 Question #8: How many years of active duty service have you completed? 






11 years or more
 
Figure 10.   Average number of years of active duty service of fleet Surface Warfare 
Officers.  50% have 0-5 years of service, 34% have 11 years or more of 
service, and 16% have 6-10 years. 
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Figure 11.    Fleet Ethnicity results.  59% of fleet Surface Warfare Officers are 
Caucasian, 15% are Spanish, 13% Asian, 9% African American, and 
4% Native American. 
 
 Question #10: How would you describe your current level of job satisfaction? 
  
 










Figure 12.   Current fleet job satisfaction level.  Research indicated that 42% of 
fleet Surface Warfare Officers are dissatisfied with their job, 38% are 
somewhat satisfied, 17% were satisfied, and 3% were very satisfied. 
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 Question #11: Rank the following factors below in order of importance when 
deciding on permanent change of station orders. 
 
¾ Ship Type 
¾ Location (Homeport) 
¾ Billet 
¾ Housing Availability 
¾ Education Opportunities 
¾ Impact of PCS moves on family 
















































Figure 13.   Ranking of Key SWO Retention Issues. 1=Not Important; 2=Not 

























































Figure 14.   NPS Ranking of Key SWO Retention Issues. 1=Not Important; 2=Not 
Important/Neutral Important/Neutral; 3=Neutral; 4=Important; 
5=Very important 
 










Figure 15.   Current education level of fleet Surface Warfare Officers.  85% of the 
fleet Surface Warfare Officers have a bachelor’s degree.  15% of fleet 
Surface Warfare Officers have graduate level education. 
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 Question #13: What was/will be your primary reason for accepting or 
declining the Surface Warfare Officer Bonus? 
 
 Results are located in Survey Monkey.  Please use the following link to access 
answers to question 13.  
http://www.surveymk.com/s.aspx?sm=P60phnT96MRwK6qzb6yvGA_3d_3d 
  
 Question #14: How much money in dollars would you require to commit to 
two Department Head tours.  If there is no amount of money that would persuade 
you to commit to two Department Head tours, please enter “none.” 
 
105 Respondents answered “none” to this question.  For those that did respond 
with a specific dollar value, the results have been summarized in the below table. 
  
SWO Bonus Fleet Response
 
Mean 117,135.92 














Table 5.   SWOs Afloat Bonus Statistics 
 
 NPS Students Bonus Statistics 
 
 Three NPS Students entered “none” while those that entered specific dollar 




















Table 6.   NPS Student SWO Bonus Amounts 
 
 Question #15: Assuming the initial bonus you specified is available to you, 
how much in dollars would you be willing to give up, if guaranteed the following:  
 
¾ Homeport 
¾ Ship Type 
¾ Billet. 
 
Homeport   Ship Type   Billet   
      
Mean 12,025 Mean 3,543 Mean 6,528 
Standard Error 2,764 Standard Error 713 Standard Error 1,382 
Median 1 Median 0 Median 0







Sample Variance 1,657,728,782 Sample Variance 109,690,606 Sample Variance 414,237,765 
Kurtosis 101.1041132 Kurtosis 39.43621048 Kurtosis 78.52286284
Skewness 9.158551321 Skewness 5.564560572 Skewness 7.709919698
Range 500,000 Range 100,000 Range 237,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 500,000 Maximum 100,000 Maximum 237,000 
Sum 2,609,538 Sum 765392 Sum 1,416,490 
Count 217 Count 216 Count 217





Homeport   Ship Type   Billet   
      
Mean 6,432 Mean 3,137 Mean 3,157 
Standard Error 1,572 Standard Error 883 Standard Error 824
Median 500 Median 0 Median 0







Sample Variance 1.26E+08 Sample Variance 39,800,659 Sample Variance 34,663,641 
Kurtosis 7.576954 Kurtosis 6.743273 Kurtosis 6.038867 
Skewness 2.627879 Skewness 2.622656 Skewness 2.398075 
Range 50,000 Range 25,000 Range 25,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 50,000 Maximum 25,000 Maximum 25,000 
Sum 328,025 Sum 160,001 Sum 161,010 
Count 51 Count 51 Count 51
Table 8.   NPS Student Homeport, Ship Type and Billet Dollar Values 
 
 Question #16: Assuming the initial bonus you specified is available to you, 
how much in dollars would you be willing to give up, if guaranteed the following:  
 
¾ Homeport and Billet 
¾ Homeport and Ship Type 
¾ Ship Type and Billet 




Billet   
Homeport and 
Ship   
    
Mean 17,453 Mean 13,917 
Standard Error 3,962 Standard Error 2,819 
Median 750 Median 500 





Sample Variance 3,391,140,774 Sample Variance 1,708,450,923 
Kurtosis 111.6783646 Kurtosis 93.00922443 
Skewness 9.613120261 Skewness 8.631033014 
Range 737,000 Range 500,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 737,000 Maximum 500,000 
Sum 3,769,801 Sum 2,992,093 
Count 216 Count 215 





Billet   
Homeport & Ship 
Type   
    
Mean 7,648 Mean 7,392 
Standard Error 1,628 Standard Error 1,682 
Median 2,000 Median 2 
Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 11,632 Standard Deviation 12,010 
Sample Variance 135,307,484 Sample Variance 144,242,650 
Kurtosis 5.351564488 Kurtosis 4.926939771 
Skewness 2.199687082 Skewness 2.216458165 
Range 50,000 Range 50,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 50,000 Maximum 50,000 
Sum 390,052 Sum 377,003 
Count 51 Count 51 
  
Ship Type & 
Billet   
Homeport, Billet & Ship 
Type   
    
Mean 4,598 Mean 12,432 
Standard Error 1,072 Standard Error 2,243 
Median 0 Median 8,000 
Mode 0 Mode 0 
Standard 
Deviation 7,656 Standard Deviation 16,017 
Sample Variance 58,609,093 Sample Variance 256,542,701 
Kurtosis 3.224834301 Kurtosis 0.825812773 
Skewness 1.94728971 Skewness 1.380709761 
Range 30,000 Range 50,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 
Maximum 30,000 Maximum 50,000 
Sum 234,506 Sum 634,057 
Count 51 Count 51 
Table 10.   NPS Student Homeport and Billet; Homeport and Ship Type; Ship 
Type and Billet; and Homeport, Billet and Ship Type Dollar Values 
 
Ship Type and 
Billet   
Homeport, Billet, and Ship 
Type   
    
Mean 8,254 Mean 23,064 
Standard Error 1,677 Standard Error 4,159 
Median 1 Median 4,000 
Mode 0 Mode 0
Standard Deviation 24,572 Standard Deviation 61,267 
Sample Variance 603,771,809 Sample Variance 3,753,639,375
Kurtosis 52.79904178 Kurtosis 88.06677766
Skewness 6.617223452 Skewness 8.24428897 
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Ship Type and 
Billet   
Homeport, Billet, and Ship 
Type   
Range 237,000 Range 737,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 237,000 Maximum 737,000 
Sum 1,766,303 Sum 5,004,865 
Count 214 Count 217
Table 11.   SWOs Afloat Homeport and Billet; Homeport and Ship; Ship Type and 
Billet; and Homeport, Billet and Ship Type Dollar Values 
 
 Question #17: Assuming the initial bonus you specified is available to you, 
how much in dollars would you be willing to give up if guaranteed the following: a 
one year sabbatical, telecommuting or geographical stability. (Sabbatical is defined 
as an unpaid year to spend as you wish while retaining benefits. Telecommuting 
would allow you to work from home on scheduled days. Geographic stability allows 
personnel to serve three consecutive years in the same geographical region.) 
 
¾ One Year Sabbatical 
¾ Telecommuting 




Sabbatical   Telecommuting   
Geographical 
Stability   
      
Mean 15,293 Mean 20,300 Mean 16,220 
Standard Error 3,213 Standard Error 5,660 Standard Error 3,439 
Median 0 Median 1 Median 1
Mode 0 Mode 0 Mode 0
Standard Deviation 46,888 
Standard 
Deviation 83,189 Standard Deviation 50,424 
Sample Variance 2,198,497,949 Sample Variance 6,920,411,378 Sample Variance 2,542,559,016
Kurtosis 60.77912439 Kurtosis 96.61847584 Kurtosis 56.53815081
Skewness 6.900125226 Skewness 9.124162688 Skewness 6.937002327
Range 500,000 Range 1,000,000 Range 500,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 500,000 Maximum 1,000,000 Maximum 500,000 
Sum 32,57,357 Sum 4,384,894 Sum 3,487,343 
Count 213 Count 216 Count 215









Sabbatical   Telecommuting   
Geographical 
Stability   
      
Mean 4,628 Mean 2,550 Mean 5,314 
Standard Error 1,499 Standard Error 885 Standard Error 1,720 
Median 0 Median 0 Median 0




Deviation 6,322 Standard Deviation 12,283 
Sample Variance 114,668,855 Sample Variance 39,967,398 Sample Variance 150,878,819 
Kurtosis 6.195949361 Kurtosis 16.2055006 Kurtosis 20.9113463 
Skewness 2.49131608 Skewness 3.810007839 Skewness 4.130113379
Range 50,000 Range 35,000 Range 75,000 
Minimum 0 Minimum 0 Minimum 0
Maximum 50,000 Maximum 35,000 Maximum 75,000 
Sum 236,052 Sum 130,051 Sum 271,051 
Count 51 Count 51 Count 51
Table 13.   NPS Student Sabbatical, Telecommuting and Geographic Stability 
Dollar Values 
 
 Question #18: List any other incentive(s) that the Navy can offer and the 
amount of the bonus that you would be willing to give up to receive that incentive. 
 “Out of the box” answers are encouraged and accepted. (Example: 
Designated parking spot - $1000.00) 
 Results are located in Survey Monkey.  Please use the following link to access 
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IV. NPS RESPONDENT PROFILE 
A. SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The survey was emailed to approximately 180 Surface Warfare Officers at the 
Naval Postgraduate School using the Surface Warfare Officer Distribution list in 
PYTHON (an electronic NPS student registration system).  There were 53 total responses 
received from respondents at NPS.  A two week deadline was given for participants to 
respond and there were no survey responses received after the deadline.  All Surface 
Warfare Officers at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have accepted the SWOCP 
bonus and are obligated to complete two department tours of at least 15 months.  Surface 
Warfare Officers at NPS will be assigned to ships and department head school 
approximately 6-9 months prior to graduation. 
 
 Question #1: I agree to participate in this survey? 
 
 All respondents agreed to participate in this survey. 
 













Figure 16.    Survey revealed that 66% of the NPS students are married, 19% are 
single, 9% are divorced, and 6% are married to other military 
members. 
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Figure 17.   Total number of dependents by NPS students.  37% of NPS students 
have 0 dependents, 41% have 1-2 dependents, 22% have 3-4 
dependents.  No NPS Surface Warfare Officer have 5 or more greater 
dependents. 
 
















Figure 18.   Survey results indicate 53% of the NPS SWO’S received their 
commission via ROTC, 20% received their commission through the 
STA-21 program, 14% received their commission through OCS, and 
13% received their commission through the USNA. 
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Figure 19.   Breakdown of NPS Student Paygrades.  Results indicate that 74% of 
NPS students are O3, 19% of NPS students are O3E, 3% are O2, 2% 
are O4, 1% are O2E, and 1% are O1. 
 
 Question #6: Where are you currently serving? 
 
 All respondents were currently serving as students at the Naval Post Graduate 
School in Monterey, CA. 
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COMTHIRDFLT   (San
Diego/Everett/Pearl)
COMFIFTHFLT   (Bahrain)





Figure 20.   Survey results indicate that 76% of the NPS students are currently 
stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School, 15% of the students are in 
the COMSEVENTHFLT AOR, and 9% of the students are in the 
COMSECONDLFT AOR.  Students not at NPS are distance learning 
students or students taking refresher courses to improve their academic 
profile code prior to enrolling at NPS. 
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 Question #8:  How many years of active duty service have you completed? 






11 years or more
 
Figure 21.   Average number of active duty service years of NPS Surface Warfare 
Officers. The results indicate that 57% of NPS SWO’S have 6-10 years 
of naval service, 29% of NPS SWO’S have 11 years of naval service, 
and 14% of NPS SWO’S have 0-5 years of naval service.  
 
















Figure 22.   NPS Ethnicity Overview.  Survey results indicate that 51% of NPS 
Surface Warfare Officers are Caucasian, 19% are Hispanic and Latino, 
18% are African American, and 12% are Asian. 
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 Question #10:  What is your current job satisfaction level? 
 
 











Figure 23.   Current NPS Job satisfaction level.  Research indicates that only 17% 
of NPS Surface Warfare Officers are very satisfied with their job, 43% 
are satisfied, 32% are somewhat satisfied, and 8% are dissatisfied. 
 









Figure 24.   Current education level of NPS Surface Warfare Officers.  Survey 
results revealed that 70% of NPS graduates have earned a bachelors 
degree, and 30% have a master’s degree.  A bachelor’s degree is 
required for admission into the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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 Question #13: What was/will be your primary reason for accepting or 
declining the Surface Warfare Officer Bonus? 
 Results are located in Survey Monkey.  Please use the following link to access 
answers to question 13.  
http://www.surveymk.com/s.aspx?sm=P60phnT96MRwK6qzb6yvGA_3d_3d 
 
 Question #18: List any other incentive(s) that the Navy can offer and the 
amount of the bonus that you would be willing to give up to receive that incentive. 
“Out of the box” answers are encouraged and accepted. (Example: Designated 
parking spot - $1000.00) 
 Results are located in Survey Monkey.  Please use the following link to access 
answers to question 13.  
http://www.surveymk.com/s.aspx?sm=P60phnT96MRwK6qzb6yvGA_3d_3d 
 
1. Overall Evaluation of Survey Responses 
There were several recurring themes related to the attitude that Junior Officers 
indicated during the survey.  These themes can be summarized into the following 
descriptive categories:  
• Lack of time spent with family members 
• Work-life balance issues 
• Excessive work hours 
• Poor command climate 
• Micromanagement 
• Threat of being selected for Individual Augmentation (IA) assignment  
• Overall job dissatisfaction levels  
Many junior officers felt that command leadership has no regard for their personal 
well-being or morale.  Due to the department head tour commitments and the opportunity 
for command, junior officers felt that a DH tour would be more stressful, because your 
career depends upon performance in the job.  The survey also indicated that it is difficult 
to place a value on the ability to be present for major personal/family milestones such as 
vacations, family reunions, weddings, class reunions, births and funerals.  Junior officers 
felt that their assigned tasks were repetitive and offered no chance for improvement or 
innovation.  Aviation and staff corps community cultures are more appealing to junior 
officers because of the high stress mentality of the Surface Warfare Officer Community. 
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Overall junior officers feel that in order to be a successful Surface Warfare Officer you 
have to work hard, fill hard sea duty billets, and have a senior mentor who can assist you 
with the detailing process. 
2. NPS Responses versus Fleet Responses 
Chapter III uses descriptive statistics to compare the differences between 
demographics, and monetary and non-monetary responses between Surface Warfare 
Officers stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School and Surface Warfare Officers 
stationed abroad onboard naval vessels, who indicated they would accept the SWOCP 
bonus.  The important difference between the NPS respondents and fleet respondents is 
that all NPS students have committed to SWOCP and are required to serve two 
department head tours or a single long department head tour. In an attempt to further 
validate our survey, we are analyzing the similarities between NPS Surface Warfare 
Officers and the top 45% of fleet respondents who indicated they would accept the 
SWOCP bonus.  Our survey revealed that graduate education, SWOCP, and geographical 
stability have a positive effect on an officer’s decision to remain in the Surface Warfare 
community.    Respondents who indicated that they were leaving active duty were 
currently serving in their second division officer tour.  Both NPS and fleet respondents 
agreed with the implementation of SWOCP but the amount of the bonus varied.  We 
attribute this to NPS students being already committed to department head tours, the 
current SWOCP and JO CSRB amount, and the fleet respondents delaying acceptance of 
the bonus, due to anticipation of an increase.  U.S. Code Title 37, Sec 323 states that an 
officer may receive multiple retention bonuses but not a total amount more than 
$200,000.  NPS and fleet Surface Warfare Officers who have signed a SWOCP contract 
regardless of race, years of service, and commissioning source listed the bonus and 
graduate school as their primary reason for continuing service in the SWO community.  
PERS-41 has made NPS their primary choice of shore duty stations for officers who have 
completed their second division officer tour.  Listed below are the commonalities 
between Surface Warfare Officers stationed at the Naval Postgraduate School and those 
stationed abroad onboard various naval vessels: 
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3. Similarities 
• Graduate Education Opportunities 
• Surface Warfare Officers are eligible to attend the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Naval War College, and civilian universities 
provided they meet entrance criteria.  Since graduate education is 
weighed heavily in the selection board and promotion criteria both 
NPS and Fleet respondents placed a high value on obtaining a 
masters degree. 
• Anticipation of an increase in monetary incentives (Compensation) 
• While the current SWOCP amount is $50,000 dollars and JOCSRB 
is $25,000 dollars, NPS and Fleet Surface Warfare continue to hear 
discussions amongst senior community leaders concerning raising 
the amount of the bonus.  This may cause officers to delay the 
signing of the SWOCP contract until they are forced to sign prior 
to the issuance of permanent change of station (PCS) orders.  If an 
increase, is granted it is highly likely that it will be retroactive. 
• Foreign language training opportunities  
• In an effort to increase career timing efforts, and the strain on the 
department head school schedule, the SWO community has began 
to offer foreign language training to NPS graduates if their career 
timing supports. 
• Family commitment 
• All NPS and Fleet respondents wanted to increase their time spent 
at home with their families.  They indicated that no amount of 
money could replace the time lost with family. 
• High operational tempo 
• The lack of concrete ships schedules, the fleet response plan, and 
extended deployments were common amongst both respondent sets 
for not accepting the Surface Warfare bonus.   
• G.I. Bill opportunities 
• The Montgomery G.I. Bill is only eligible for graduates of Officer 
Candidate School.  Graduates were grouped by commissioning 
source such as NROTC, USNA, and OCS.  Respondents who 
declined to accept SWOCP indicated their plan to use the G.I. Bill 





• Geographical stability 
• NPS and Fleet respondents indicated that geographical stability 
was one of the most important reasons for accepting SWOCP.  
Although not an official incentive, this opportunity provides 
officers the ability to purchase a home, secure a job for a spouse, 
and allows their children to attend the same school without the 
chance of transferring schools prior to the end of the school year.  
4. Differences 
• Job Satisfaction 
• NPS and Fleet Surface Warfare Officers are vastly different in 
their levels of job satisfaction.  A key contributing to this result 
indicates that junior officers have a wide range of responsibilities, 
while NPS Surface Warfare Officers primary responsibility is 
school.   
• Working Environment 
• NPS and Fleet Surface Warfare Officers work environments are 
completely different.  NPS officers are in an academic 
environment while fleet Surface Warfare officers are either at sea 
or inport.  Ships have continuous bells, alarms, and whistles that 
are used to signify drills and evolutions. At or sea or import 
working hours are typically eight to twelve hours a day, while NPS 
students have a typical six hour per day of class time. 
• Relationships with superiors and subordinates 
• There is a distinct difference between the chain of command at 
NPS and fleet Surface Warfare Officers.  At NPS the chain of 
command is considered administrative, while the fleet chain of 
command has an operational and administrative chain of command 
who make tactical, operational, and administrative decisions 
regarding ships, weapons systems, and sailors.  
• Leadership Experience 
• The level of leadership amongst NPS and Fleet Surface Warfare 
Officer is the same.  NPS students have completed two division 
officer tours and been screened for department head by an 
administrative board.  Most NPS students attended legacy SWOS 
and have experience in leading two divisions while, fleet Surface 
Warfare Officers devote most of their time to obtaining their 
qualifications using computer based training (CBT) and have less 
time to devote to leading a division.  In some cases, NPS students 
have completed a shore duty tour on a staff prior to arrival at NPS. 
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In order to see how well the fleet “stayers” compare to those of their NPS 
counterparts, we analyzed the results for a small portion of our fleet sample.  This small 
portion consisted of the 45 percent of those most willing to stay navy and having the 
lowest monetary bonus requirements. We used 45 percent because this is the percentage 
of SWOs that must be retained starting in fiscal year 2008 in order to meet future 
Department Head goals.  Our goal was to see if the answers of our fleet “stayers” 
mirrored what we saw from our results of NPS students who by definition are all 
“stayers.”  Our expectation was that we would see that they were similar in how they 
valued non-monetary incentives.  What we found however, was not the case.  We were 
surprised to learn that the fleet “stayers” placed greater value on non-monetary incentives 
than did their NPS counterparts.  We specifically looked at the non-monetary valuations 











































































































































































































































































































Figure 30.   Ship type value for NPS and Fleet “Stayers” 
 
These results serve to reinforce our hypothesis that monetary incentives can only 
be a part of the overall SWOs retention strategy.  The importance of non-monetary 
incentives such as Homeport, Billet and Ship Type etc. cannot and should not be 
underestimated. 
Some of the reasons for the increased importance on non-monetary incentives 
from the fleet might stem from the fact that they are serving in very demanding 
operational assignments with extended time away from family and friends.  This could 
well cause the fleet “stayers” to look at the Navy more pessimistically and therefore 
require them to demand more monetary and non-monetary incentives in order for them to 
continue their SWO careers.  Anyone serving aboard ship would certainly understand this 
thought process.  Our NPS students have presumably been out of the operational 
environment for some time and may look more favorably and optimistically on how they 
value monetary and non-monetary incentives, thereby causing them to not reveal their 
true worth for each. 
Another influence may be the generational gap between the fleet “stayers” and the 
NPS students.  Those serving aboard ship at the time of our survey may be between as 
many as five to seven years junior to their NPS counterparts.  As such, they may certainly 
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place a higher value on time spent away from family and friends as well as the rigors of 
sea duty.  As these officers represent the future of the SWO community, the Navy SWO 
leadership should not ignore the changing preferences in the next generation of SWOs.  If 
their needs are not taken into consideration early in their commissions, then the correct 
types and amounts of incentives (both monetary and non-monetary) may not be in place 
when these officers reach the decision point of whether to go on to Department Head jobs 
or exit the Navy.  Ignoring these changing attitudes and values would only serve to 
exacerbate the current problems of SWO retention and place unnecessary additional 
burdens on the existing SWO infrastructure.   
Community diversity within the SWO community has historically ranged about 
75% White and 25% Non-White.  Non-White is categorized as Black, Asian, Native 

















Figure 31.   Fleet and Survey Ethnicity Percentages 
 
Diversity among NPS students is 75 percent White and 25 percent Non-White.  
However, diversity among the top 45 percent of fleet “stayers” is 87 percent White and 
13 percent Non-White.  The SWO community will need to take a more aggressive look at 
meeting the CNO’s Diversity objective with “next generation” officers.   There is no 
direct correlation to ethnicity and preferred incentives.   
The United States Naval Academy, USNA, has historically had a higher attrition 
rate than any other commissioning source within the SWO community.  USNA graduates 
are required to complete a five year minimum service obligation, while officers from 
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other accession sources are only required to complete a four year service obligation.   
Despite the vast difference in education cost to the Navy, USNA officers exit the Navy at 
a higher percentage than officers accessed through other commissioning source.  Our data 


















Figure 32.   Commissioning Sources Percentages 
 
The 20 percent difference in USNA graduates for NPS students and fleet 
“stayers,” indicates USNA graduates required a higher monetary bonus (approximately 
32 percent required a higher bonus) than the top 45% top of fleet “stayers.”   
There were 111 fleet respondents (43% of fleet respondents) that stated “no 
amount” of money could persuade them to commit to Department Head tours, 82 
respondents gave specific reasons.  A few reasons noted were the community’s and 
command’s lack of concern for quality of life, high operational requirements, poor 
leadership/mentorship, many of these have already been addressed in this study and 
previous studies.  So what can the SWO community do to retain the officers that stated 
“no amount of money” would persuade them to complete two Department Head tours?”  
There are three common incentives stated by these officers that might persuade them to 
complete two DH tours. The first incentive is to decrease the amount of inport working 
hours, which would improve quality of life issues.  The second incentive is to decrease 
deployment/underway schedule.  The third incentive is to have a command climate and 
leadership that is concerned about the professional development and personal concerns of 
their people (both officers and enlisted) more than the leaders’ personal career.  
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V. APPLICATION OF REVERSE COMBINATORIAL AUCTION 
UTILIZING SURVEY REPORTED VALUES 
A. USING REVERSE COMBINATORIAL AUCTION WITH SURVEY 
REPORTED VALUES  
Using the results of the survey previously described, a reverse combinatorial 
auction can be developed to examine the effects of non-monetary incentives on Surface 
Warfare Officer retention.  To this, a concise description of auction theory is offered.  
The design and application of a reverse combinatorial auction is described, as is the 
methodology for determining key numbers used in the auction.  The problem of winner 
determination is discussed.  Finally, the results from the auction are discussed.   
In applying auction theory to the problem of Surface Warfare Officer retention, 
there are several factors that must be considered.  Most of these will be discussed as they 
become germane to the analysis, but the most important question is to determine the 
auction’s purpose.  The authors have set out to answer the following primary question:  
what incentive or combination of incentives can the Navy offer that will assist in 
retaining the required number of department heads?  In answering the primary question, it 
is helpful to break it down into more discrete questions that allow for a methodical 
treatment.  The following questions serve this purpose.  If officers are offered the 
opportunity to choose a package of incentives in place of a uniform cash bonus, can the 
Navy maintain the current level of retention for less cost?  Can more officers be retained 
at the same price?  Optimally, is there a win-win solution: increase retention and decrease 
the cost to the Navy? 
B. AUCTION THEORY 
The authors used a reverse combinatorial auction to examine the effects of 
offering a “menu” of retention incentives.  The following explanation of auction theory 
serves to outline the major ideas incorporated into the examination of this question. 
Auctions ask and answer the most fundamental question in economics: who 
should get the goods, and at what price?  Most familiar is the ascending price auction, 
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where many potential buyers submit bids for an item offered by a seller.  The person 
submitting the highest bid wins the auction, and pays the amount bid for the item being 
auctioned.  Ideally, this method serves to allocate the good to the person who values it 
most, an idea essential to market economies.  A variation on this auction is the “second 
price” ascending auction (usually conducted in a one-time sealed-bid-format, where all 
bids are viewed simultaneously after the auction closes).  This auction modifies the 
pricing rule as follows: let the winning bidder pay the social opportunity cost of his 
winnings, rather than his bid.  This serves to induce truthful bidding (that is, bidding the 
highest amount one is willing to pay) as a dominant strategy.  The winner (who bid the 
highest, and thus values the item the most) pays the amount of the second highest bid.   
A reverse auction is an auction in which the roles of buyers and sellers are 
reversed.  The primary objective is to drive purchase prices downward.  Instead of one 
seller soliciting bids from multiple buyers and awarding the item to the highest bidder, in 
a reverse auction one buyer solicits bids from many potential sellers.  The winner is the 
seller who bids the lowest, provided that seller meets any other conditions as determined 
by the buyer.  (To be precise, the bids in reverse auctions are actually “ask” prices, that 
is, the lowest prices the sellers will accept for the item.  However, to minimize confusion, 
this paper will continue to refer to all entries in an auction as “bids.”)  Recently, reverse 
auctions have been used extensively in procurement applications. 
A combinatorial auction is an auction in which buyers can place bids on 
combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items.  This is useful 
in that the values placed on an item up for bid can change according to what other items 
the buyer possesses or is in a position to obtain.  In economics terms, the motivation 
behind the use of a combinatorial auction is the presence of complementarities among the 
items that differ among bidders.  For example, a mobile phone company may value 
licenses in two adjacent cities more than the sum of the individual license values, because 
the company’s customers value the ability to roam between both cities.29 
                                                 
29 Cramton, Shoham, & Steinberg 2006. 
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A reverse combinatorial auction combines characteristics of reverse auctions and 
combinatorial auctions.  In simplest terms, many sellers offer package bids (combinations 
of different types of incentives) to a single buyer.  This makes the reverse combinatorial 
auction attractive to apply to the question of SWO retention.  It has been shown that 
certain groups of officers respond more strongly to non-monetary incentives.  Thus, the 
key to retaining more or different officers is to offer combinations of monetary and non-
monetary incentives to the pool of officers.  
Winner determination is the most vexing aspect of reverse combinatorial auctions.  
Theoretically, in the population of bids submitted by the potential sellers, there is one that 
is in effect the “lowest price” bid.  The buyer’s task is to determine this winning bid.  In 
practice, this is often extremely difficult, and is usually approached from an operations 
research or computer science tack.  For the purpose of this paper, the authors 
purposefully defined several assumptions and restricted the scope of the questions asked, 
allowing for a meaningful treatment of the winner determination problem. 
C.   SURVEY RESULTS:  INCENTIVE VALUATION, BIDS, AND COSTS 
To simulate a reverse combinatorial auction, it was necessary to construct a range 
of bids from potential sellers.  In the case of SWO retention, the sellers are the individual 
officers and the buyer is the Navy.  The results of the survey administered by the authors 
were used to place a value on the non-monetary incentives, construct a range of bids for 
each of several potential bid packages, and serve as a notional cost of the non-monetary 
incentives to the Navy. 
The survey began by asking what monetary bonus would be required to retain the 
officer for two department head tours.  Following questions asked how much money the 
officer would give up in return for each non-monetary incentive alone (guaranteed 
homeport, billet, or ship type.)  The next questions asked how much the officer would 
give up for the three different combinations of two of the three non-monetary incentives, 
and for all three non-monetary incentives.  Finally, three different non-monetary 
incentives (telecommuting, sabbatical, and geographic stability) were offered separately, 
asking the same question.   
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For each combination of incentives, the amount of the monetary bonus the officer 
would give up can be assumed to be the value of that package of non-monetary incentives 
to the officer.  This assumption is key to the subsequent construction of the auction. 
The concept of additive marginal utility was expressly considered in the design of 
the survey.  Simply stated, to any given respondent, a package of incentives could be 
more (or less) valuable than the sum of its parts to any given respondent.  Thus, the 
authors sought to elicit values for the packages containing multiple non-monetary 
incentives by asking those questions explicitly.  It is worth noting that it is not possible to 
“deconstruct” these package values to the values placed on individual non-monetary 
incentive in the package. 
Additionally, no mention of a change in detailing process was made in the survey.  
Thus, any biases present in the officer population based on current detailing processes are 
likely represented in the reported values.  For example, an officer at the top of the pack 
(and thus almost guaranteed his or her pick of homeports) would likely report a lower 
value for packages than would the “average” officer. 
There is a significant drawback to the method used in the survey to determine the 
value of the incentive packages.  The respondents were asked to state the monetary bonus 
they would accept to be retained, and this was used as the base amount from which they 
would give up money in exchange for the non-monetary incentives.  105 of 260 fleet 
respondents stated at the outset that there is no amount of money that could persuade 
them to stay in the Navy; thus, they had no basis for valuing the non-monetary incentives 
and reported no values for the incentive packages.  A real-life reverse combinatorial 
auction (as opposed to the ex post auction constructed by the authors from survey 
responses) would offer the opportunity to place package bids at the outset, potentially 
offering these “no amount of money” respondents a chance to get what they require in 
non-monetary incentives to stay in.   
The cost to the Navy for each of the non-monetary incentive packages was 
estimated from the population of values placed on the package by the survey respondents.  
One can reasonably assume that the cost to the Navy lies at some percentile of the range 
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of the survey assigned values.  By changing the cost (simulating that a different portion 
of the officer population values the incentive package more than its cost) we can explore 
the sensitivity of the population to the cost of each incentive package. 
It is pertinent here to discuss the difference in non-monetary incentives offered 
with respect to their cost to the Navy.  The three “non traditional” incentives 
(telecommuting, sabbatical, and geographic stability) have real costs that the Navy would 
have to pay in addition to the normal costs of sustaining an officer.  The other incentives 
(homeport, billet, and ship type) have no readily quantifiable “accounting” cost to the 
Navy.  That is, in the aggregate, it doesn’t cost the Navy any more to send one officer to a 
given homeport or billet than it costs to send any other officer.  Cost differences in 
specific instances would essentially balance out.  Thus, the only cost to the Navy for the 
“traditional” non-monetary incentive is an opportunity or “flexibility” cost.  Valuation of 
such a cost is beyond the scope of this paper.  For the purpose of this paper, all costs are 
elicited by defining the portion of officers that would value the incentive package more 
than it cost.  For example, if it is assumed that 25% of officers place a higher value on the 
sabbatical incentive than it would cost the Navy to provide, the cost of the sabbatical 
would be defined as the bid at the 75th percentile of the population of bids for that 
incentive. 
Bids for each package were constructed from the base monetary bonus requested, 
the values placed on the non-monetary incentives, and the cost to the Navy of the non-
monetary incentives.  The formula for this calculation follows later in this paper. 
D. DETERMINATION OF REQUIRED NUMBERS 
The survey was administered to two distinct groups, NPS SWOs and junior 
SWOs afloat.  Only responses from the junior SWO afloat group were used in 
constructing the auctions, as it can be assumed that those responses are a representative 
sample of the junior SWO community.  All NPS SWO respondents have already 
committed to being retained, so their responses may be considered to be not 
representative of the community at large. 
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BuPers has set a goal of 45% retention for YGs 03-06.  This is significantly 
higher than the 31% retention demanded in previous years, due to the smaller size of the 
recent accession classes.  Thus, the entering argument for the auction was to retain 45% 
of the population.  This equates to 117 of the 260 fleet respondents. 
Of the 260 responses from junior SWOs afloat, 105 stated that there was no 
amount of money that would retain them.  Due to reasons previously discussed, they 
subsequently reported no values for the non-monetary incentive packages, and were 
excluded from the auction.  Additionally, officers whose base monetary bids exceeded 
$200,000 were excluded, for two reasons.  First, most bids in this category were 
obviously not intended to be taken seriously (several respondents replied with seven—or 
more-- figure bonus requests).  Second, there is a $200,000 Title IX cap on officer 
bonuses.  After removing both the “no amount of money” respondents and the greater 
than $200,000 respondents, there remained 144 legitimate bids.  The auction therefore 
seeks to retain 117 of the remaining 144 respondents. 
E.   AUCTION DESIGN 
In brief, a reverse combinatorial auction was constructed using the values reported 
by fleet respondents by awarding non-monetary incentives to those who valued the 
incentives more than they cost, and decrementing the initial monetary bonus by the 
reported value.  A detailed description of this process follows.  This process is detailed 
for a notional bidder in Appendix A. 
The data from fleet respondents was returned in Excel spreadsheet form.  From 
this master spreadsheet, the population of values for each bid package was separated into 
sheets. A single auction was constructed that treated the reported incentive values of each 
survey respondent as a group of bids for those incentive packages.   
For each bidder, the auction first considered the value placed on the seven 
possible combinations of homeport, billet, and ship type.  All packages for which the 
reported value to the officer exceeded the cost to the Navy were compared, and the 
combination that delivered the highest excess value was awarded.  In the case of a tie, the 
combination containing fewer incentives was awarded.   
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The auction next looked at the three “non-traditional” incentives of 
telecommuting, sabbatical, and geographic stability.  Awarding these incentives was 
more straightforward, as no comparison between the three was required.  The auction 
simply awarded the incentive if the reported value (the “bid”) was more than the cost of 
that incentive.   
Given the eight different combinations of traditional incentives (including 
“money only” as one item in the menu), and the eight different combinations of non-
traditional incentives (including “none” as an option), there are 64 unique packages that 
could be awarded by this auction. 
Having determined what incentives to award the bidder, the auction then 
considered the base amount of cash bonus requested.  First, the value reported (the “bid”) 
for each awarded incentive was deducted from the initially requested base bonus amount, 
giving an adjusted bonus.  Second, the cost of the awarded incentives was added to this 
adjusted bonus amount, giving the effective cost to the Navy to retain that bidder.   
This process was completed for all bidders in the auction.  The auction then 
compared the range of effective costs to the Navy for all bidders, and selected the 117 
lowest bidders.  The effective cost of the first bidder not retained (the first excluded bid) 
was set as the cost at which the Navy would retain all bidders that were selected for 
retention.  This first excluded bid served as the new base bonus amount.  In other words, 
the Navy would give each retained officer the amount of the first excluded bid via a 
combination of cash bonus and awarded incentives, valued at their costs to the Navy.  
Discussion of the implications of this design follows later in this paper. 
After the base amount to be awarded to each bidder retained was determined, the 
amount of cash bonus for each bidder was determined by subtracting the cost to the Navy 
of all awarded incentives from the base amount.  For comparison purposes, the value 
received by each bidder was calculated by summing the bids for all awarded incentives 
and the amount of cash bonus awarded.  In several cases, bidders that received relatively 
small cash bonuses ($20-30K) were awarded incentive packages that they valued more 
than ten times that amount. 
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F.   IMPLICATIONS OF AUCTION DESIGN 
An appropriately designed auction can elicit truthful bids; that is, it is in the best 
interest of all participants to bid their true value for each item (in this case, a package of 
incentives.)  There are two implications of auction design to consider in this case:  the 
second price auction format and incentive compatibility. 
A reverse second price auction induces truth-telling as a dominant strategy by 
requiring the winner (the bidder with the highest bid) to pay the amount of the next 
lowest bid (the “second price.”)  In the case of a multiple-winner reverse second-price 
auction, all winning sellers receive the amount of the next highest (or first excluded or 
lowest losing) bid.  In this auction, after determining the effective cost to the Navy for 
each bidder, the first excluded bid (the second price) was chosen as the retention price the 
Navy would pay to each winner.  Thus, there is no incentive for a any officer to bid 
higher or lower than the true amount he or she would require in order to be retained.   
An auction is said to be incentive compatible if bidders fare best when they 
truthfully reveal the amount they value each item in their bids.  In the case of this auction, 
truthful reporting of the value of an incentive package determines only whether a bidder 
is retained or not; and, if so, whether he or she will receive the incentive package; it does 
not affect the amount of cash bonus received or total value received.  This is because the 
first excluded bid was used to set a base amount to award each retained bidder, and this 
amount was decremented by the Navy’s cost of the awarded incentive package, vice the 
reported value of the package.  Thus, two retained bidders may place far different values 
on the same incentive package, but their cash bonus would be the same.  In this auction, 
truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all bidders. 
G.   AUCTION RESULTS 
Setting the costs for each incentive at the 50th percentile (with the exception of 
sabbatical and telecommuting set at the 60th percentile for reason of believability) returns 




First excluded bid- money only (equivalent 
to cash bonus required without incentives) 
$175,000 
First excluded bid- incentives offered $101,250 
Total cost to retain- money only $20,475,000 
Total cost to retain- incentives offered $11,846,250 
Average cash bonus- incentives offered $89,402 
Average SWO value- incentives offered $149,437 
Table 14.   Auction Results 
 
In this case, it is obviously far cheaper for the Navy to retain the 117 required 
officers using a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives.  The Navy saved 
an average of $73,750 per retained officer, for a total savings of 42% ($8,628,750.)  
Additionally, the average officer received a total incentive package worth $60,000 more 
than the cash bonus alone.  Since the officer valued the incentives more than they cost the 
Navy (a prerequisite for the awarding of the incentive), the Navy saved money and the 
retained officer gained value—the win-win outcome that was discussed previously. 
The above results serve as an example of the principle of the auction approach for 
one particular case. A sensitivity analysis is useful in analyzing the cost savings to the 
Navy as a function of varying both the incentive costs and the desired number of officers 
to be retained.  Figure 34 shows the cost savings as a function of both variables.  The 
desired number of officers to retain ranges from 60 to 130 in increments of 10, and the 
cost of the incentive ranges from 0% to 100% in 10% increments. 
The sensitivity analysis allows several useful observations.  First, as the number 
of officers to be retained increases, the savings increase significantly.  Specifically, there 
is a significant jump in savings when going from 100 retained to 110 retained.  This is to 
be expected: if the Navy is retaining relatively few officers, it can choose to retain the 
cheapest.  Savings from non-monetary incentives will be more modest for these less 




officers become more expensive.  At this point, the potential for cost savings to the Navy 
increases significantly as these more expensive officers elect to take non-monetary 
incentives in lieu of cash.   
There is a large drop in savings as the incentive cost rises above 50%, whereas 
cost savings is relatively stable in the 0% to 50% range.  This is directly attributable to 
the approach used to elicit the values of the incentives.  A fair amount of survey 
respondents indicated a value of zero for many of the incentives.  This skewed the 
population later used to determine cost, so that up to 50% of the values for any given 
incentive were very close to zero.  Once the cost of the incentive rises above 50%, the 
cost savings diminish as expected.   
Finally, the results from the sensitivity analysis serve to emphasize the 
tremendous power of this approach to deliver the win-win combination of significant 
savings to the Navy and concurrent significant increases in value to the officers.  In every 
case, the average officer receives more value than the Navy has to pay for, and the Navy 
saves a significant amount when compared to the amount of money that would be 
required to retain the officers without the non-monetary incentives.   
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of our survey revealed several important facts about officer retention, 
many of which have already been noted in previous studies.  The most common 
community dissatisfiers identified in our study were still the imbalance between work and 
family life and overall community dissatisfaction.  Many officers stated that the current 
retention monetary bonus system is inadequate and does not provide enough 
compensation to overlook community displeasures, such as poor command climate and 
excessive in-port working hours.  However, non-monetary incentives, such as 
geographical stability and in-port telecommuting, were popular alternative retention 
incentives suggested by survey respondents that would provide adequate compensation to 
persuade retention.  Non-monetary retention incentive creates a “win-win” opportunity 
for both the Navy and the officer.   
Non-monetary incentives provide the major link between the SWO community 
retaining the “right” officer at the greatest cost savings to the Navy.  The results of our 
combinatorial model concluded that the optimal retention bonus system should 
incorporate both a geographical stability option incentive and a monetary option 
incentive.  Establishing a monetary and non-monetary retention bonus system will give 
the SWO community the needed flexibility, maintain the appropriate quantity and quality 
of officers and offer cost-savings to the Navy, while providing continued officer 
satisfaction.30   
Recently the SWO community has been successful at exceeding department head 
retention requirements for year groups 2000 and 2001; however these year groups were 
two of largest officer accession year groups since introduction of the current monetary 
retention bonus system.  Meeting department heads numbers for these two year groups, 
sent the wrong message back to community leaders.  Community leaders believe that a 
monetary bonus system is the “best” way to meet retention requirements, and have 
                                                 
30 Filip, Armed Forces Comptroller, Winter 2007. 
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proposed to increase the SWO retention bonus to $100,000.  The proposed increase is 
believed to provide the community with the needed flexibility and ability to maintain the 
appropriate quantity and quality of officers.  But, as noted in our study, money isn’t the 
only motivator to encourage retention.   
Due to the Global War on Terrorism and the increasing demand to sustain 
maritime mission requirements, annual department head requirement have increased from 
275.  Starting with year groups 2002 and 2003, annual department heads requirements 
have increased to 281 and 294, respectively.  However, while the annual requirement of 
department heads increased, the number of officer accessions for these two year groups 
deceased by an average of twenty percent.  The SWO community will be faced with the 
challenge of meeting department head numbers with a smaller pool of officers to choose 
from.  The needed flexibility and ability to maintain the appropriate quantity and quality 
of officers will be difficult, with the current monetary retention bonus system, especially 
since 43% of fleet respondents stated that no amount of money would persuade them to 
commit to two department head tours.   
The purpose of this project was to find the optimal combination of retention base 
incentives, monetary and non-monetary that could increase junior officer retention rates, 
by providing the greatest value to the officer at the least cost to the navy.  A summary of 
the answers to the specific research questions appears below, followed by 
recommendations for additional research. 
1. What incentive can the Navy offer in addition to SWOCP that will  
assist in closing the gap at the Department Head level? 
Survey results revealed the Navy should offer incentives that will improve and 
stabilize the imbalance between the work and life relationship to close the gap at the 
Department Head level.  This type of incentive should include non-monetary incentives; 
such as guaranteed homeport selection, geographical stability, telecommuting, and/or a 
one year sabbatical.  These non-monetary incentives often had significantly different 
values across officers, however, indicating that the “optimal” retention incentive package 
depended on the individual officer.  There is no “one-size-fits-all” ideal retention 
incentive.  
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2. Why are SWOS continuing to leave the Navy prior to their 
Department Head tours? 
Respondents stated various reasons why they were actually leaving the Navy prior 
to Department Head tours.  The overwhelming reasons were centered on the imbalance 
between the work and family life relationship and overall community dissatisfaction, 
such as poor command climate and lack of mentorship. 
3. What incentive(s) do SWOs value the most? 
SWOs value retention incentives that will have the greatest effect on stabilizing 
work and family life.  When comparing guaranteed homeport, ship type, and/or billet 
selection, fleet and NPS respondents valued the ability to have their desired a guaranteed 
homeport selection the most.  When comparing geographical stability, a one year 
sabbatical, or telecommuting, fleet respondents valued telecommuting during in-port, 
non-duty days the most, while NPS respondents valued geographical stability the most.   
4. What value in terms of dollars do SWOs assign to their preferred  
  incentives? 
Fleet respondents valued a guaranteed homeport selection at $12,000 and NPS 
respondents valued it at $6400 (both dollar values are mean values from Tables 3 and 7, 
respectively). Fleet respondents valued telecommuting at $20,000 and NPS respondents 
valued geographical stability at $5300 (both dollar values are mean values from Tables 5 
and 9, respectively).  These respondents were willing to forgo $20,000 on average and as 
much as one million dollars for the ability to work from home on various days.  NPS 
respondents valued geographical stability the most and were willing to forgo $5300 on 
average and as much as $75,000. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH  
The survey analysis and model results indicate that there are several non-
monetary incentives in addition to SWOCP that may positively influence retention in the 
Surface Warfare Officer community.  Further research must be able to determine the 
correct combination of SWOCP bonus and non-monetary incentives required to produce 
the annual department head requirement and retain quality officers.  If conducting a 
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follow-on survey we recommend that a reminder email be sent to all survey participants, 
all commissioning sources are included such as the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and 
you are able to identify a respondent’s gender.  Based upon the results, there are several 
questions and areas that warrant further research such as: 
• An analysis of the incentive values between males and females.  For 
example do females place a lower value on non-monetary incentives such 
as geographical stability, sabbatical, or telecommuting.  Our survey did 
not ask respondents to include their gender.  Future surveys will need to 
capture the gender of respondents. 
• What are the primary reasons that Surface Warfare Officers lateral transfer 
or leave active duty?  We recommend that Surface Warfare Officers who 
are lateral transferring or leaving active duty be interviewed or asked to 
perform an exit survey detailing their reason for leaving the SWO 
community. 
• Should voluntary separation pay have been offered to the SWO 
Community?  In addition, how many officers from the various 
commissioning sources such as USNA, OCS, and NROTC accepted 
voluntary separation pay? 
• Conduct further analysis of demographics.  Attempt to determine the value 
minorities and females place on SWOCP and its impact on retention of 
these officers.  Future research should seek to determine the value 
minorities and females place on non-monetary incentives. 
• Creation of a SWOCP model that is similar to a cafeteria auction, where 
officers would be guaranteed homeport, platform type, and job type but 
required to accept a reduced SWOCP payment amount. 
• Quantify the cost to the Navy for each non-monetary incentive such as 
telecommuting, geographical stability, and sabbatical. 
Several new incentives were recommended to be implemented in the Surface 
Warfare Community through answers to our open ended questions.  We have listed a few 
of these recommendations below: 
• WEPS/CSO billets should be afforded the option to transfer to another 
ship at the completion of their first department head tour.  The ship must 
be in the same homeport, as to minimize costs to the Navy. 





• Specialize NPS graduates into their designated field of study such as 
Financial Management, National Security Affairs, System Engineering 
Analysis or Information Warfare upon completion of department head 
tours. 
• Implement career sea pay for Surface Warfare Officers while on shore 
duty, similar to the aviation and submarine communities. 
• Offer more graduate education opportunities at civilian universities. 
• Develop a SWOIP (Surface Warfare Officer Incentive Pay) for department 
heads serving in Yokosuka and Sasebo.  This pay will be similar to 
Assignment Incentive Pay for enlisted sailors. 
Retention of quality officers is not only critical to the Surface Warfare Officer 
Community but to the U.S. Navy.  If retention does not improve, there will not be enough 
personnel to man the 300 ship Navy envisioned by the CNO.  There is no one clear 
solution to the retention of Surface Warfare Officers.  We believe the correct approach is 
to determine how best to use non-monetary incentives in a way that allows the Navy to 
meet its SWO retention goals at the minimum cost.  Our research revealed that the 
“optimal” combination of retention based incentives depends on the preferences of the 
individual officer.  Certain non-monetary incentives have high value, on average, to the 
officer population, but the valuation of the incentives varies significantly and widely 
across the officer population.  Officers should only receive non-monetary incentives 
when they value those incentives highly relative to the cost to the Navy of providing 
those incentives.  Thus, there is no single “optimal” package of incentives that can be 
offered to retain all officers; there is a unique optimal package for every officer that will 
increase the value he or she receives and concurrently reduce the cost to the Navy to 
retain him or her.  The approach introduced here is one way of determining what 
optimized packages might look like.  Furthermore, it quantifies the cost to the Navy and 
the value to the officer.  The Navy will continue to aggressively address retention through 
monetary and non-monetary incentives in the upcoming years to retain high quality 
officers and meet its annual department head requirements.  It is the authors’ hope that 
this approach might serve useful in this endeavor. 
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APPENDIX A. MODEL SPREADSHEET 
Retained Retained Rejected
115 2 6
Cost of 117 Check 117 124
Lowest Bids 100,000$                                   
Cost of 101,250$                                  121
124 Lowest Bid 22
Monetary Bonus NonMonetary Bonus SWO Value Avg. cash
Total cost of 117
cheapest 20,475,000$                            11,846,250$             17,484,100$       89,402$    
Avg. cost of 117
cheapest 175,000$                                   101,250$                    149,437$              
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Homeport Retained Retained Rejected
in value population 50% 5000 106 11 3
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Ship Bonus amount of 117 Check 117 121
in value population 50% 0 Lowest Bids 150,000$  
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Billet Bonus amount of 175,000$ 
in value population 50% 1250 130 Lowest Bid
Location of cost (percentile) Cost HP and B
in value population 50% 10000 Retain Target 117
Location of cost (percentile) Cost HP and S
in value population 50% 7500
Location of cost (percentile) Cost S and B
in value population 50% 5000
Location of cost (percentile) Cost All 3
in value population 50% 15000
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Sabb
in value population 60% 5000
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Telecom
in value population 60% 5000
Location of cost (percentile) Cost Geostab
in value population 50% 5000  





0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Monetary Bonus 21,000,000$         21,000,000$    21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   21,000,000$   
NonMonetary Bonus 12,600,000$         11,399,760$    11,399,760$   11,399,760$   11,460,000$   11,940,000$   12,000,120$   12,600,000$   13,440,000$   15,000,000$   16,800,000$   21,000,000$   
SWO Value 17,554,601$         19,138,675$    19,138,675$   19,138,675$   18,900,915$   18,953,224$   18,288,260$   17,554,601$   17,372,500$   17,149,100$   17,934,800$   21,000,000$   
Ave Monetary Bonus 175,000$             175,000$        175,000$       175,000$       175,000$       175,000$       175,000$        175,000$       175,000$       175,000$       175,000$       175,000$       
Ave Non-Monetary Bonus 105,000$             94,998$          94,998$         94,998$         95,500$         99,500$         100,001$        105,000$       112,000$       125,000$       140,000$       175,000$       
Ave SWO Value 146,288$             159,489$        159,489$       159,489$       157,508$       157,944$       152,402$        146,288$       144,771$       142,909$       149,457$       175,000$       
Ave SWO Cash 91,668$               94,998$          94,998$         94,998$         93,417$         94,983$         91,905$          91,668$         94,242$         103,230$       126,998$       173,167$       
Retention Sensitivity
10
60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130
Monetary Bonus 21,000,000$         6,600,000$      7,700,000$     8,800,000$     9,900,000$     12,500,000$   19,250,000$   21,000,000$   26,000,000$   
Non-Monetary Bonus 12,600,000$         3,660,000$      4,900,000$     6,000,000$     6,840,000$     9,100,000$     11,275,000$   12,600,000$   18,304,000$   
SWO Value 17,554,601$         7,589,000$      9,177,700$     10,475,701$   11,415,701$   13,950,601$   16,212,101$   17,554,601$   23,556,101$   
Ave Monetary Bonus 175,000$             110,000$        110,000$       110,000$       110,000$       125,000$       175,000$        175,000$       200,000$       
Ave Non-Monetary Bonus 105,000$             61,000$          70,000$         75,000$         76,000$         91,000$         102,500$        105,000$       140,800$       
Ave SWO Value 146,288$             126,483$        131,110$       130,946$       126,841$       139,506$       147,383$        146,288$       181,201$       
Ave SWO Cash 91,668$               42,917$          52,103$         57,821$         60,286$         75,781$         88,115$          91,668$         127,205$       
Cost Sensitivity
10 0.1
8,400,000$          0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
60 4,050,000$      4,050,000$     4,050,000$     3,870,000$     3,720,000$     3,539,940$      2,940,000$     2,100,000$     1,200,000$     300,000$       -$              
70 3,850,000$      3,850,000$     3,850,000$     3,850,000$     4,060,000$     3,604,930$      2,800,000$     2,240,000$     980,000$       350,000$       -$              
80 4,200,000$      4,200,000$     4,200,000$     4,000,000$     3,932,800$     3,439,920$      2,800,000$     2,400,000$     800,000$       400,000$       -$              
90 4,005,000$      4,005,000$     4,005,000$     3,600,000$     3,240,000$     3,149,910$      3,060,000$     1,980,000$     -$              450,000$       -$              
100 4,900,000$      4,900,000$     4,900,000$     4,950,300$     4,700,000$     4,250,000$      3,400,000$     2,800,000$     1,500,000$     1,900,000$     -$              
110 10,450,000$    10,450,000$   10,450,000$   10,120,000$   9,460,000$     9,020,000$      7,975,000$     7,700,000$     7,150,000$     5,390,000$     -$              
120 9,600,240$      9,600,240$     9,600,240$     9,540,000$     9,060,000$     8,999,880$      8,400,000$     7,560,000$     6,000,000$     4,200,000$     -$              
130 9,100,000$      9,100,000$     9,100,000$     9,100,000$     9,490,000$     9,100,000$      7,696,000$     7,150,000$     4,550,000$     5,720,000$     0$                  
Figure 34.   Cost Sensitivity Change table includes ranges from 0% to 100%.  Retention Sensitivity Change table includes 
ranges from 60 to 130 for monetary bonus(cost to Navy or value to SWOs), non-monetary bonus( total cost to the 
Navy), SWO value(total value to SWOs of non-monetary bonuses), Average Monetary Bonus, Average Non-
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Figure 35.   Combined Sensitivity to SWOs retained. 
 
 78
Bids Costs Difference Awarded
Base bonus amount 150000
Homeport 20000 5000 15000
Ship type 10000 0 10000
Billet 10000 1250 8750
Homeport and Billet 25000 10000 15000
Homeport and Ship 50000 7500 42500 Yes
Ship type and Billet 20000 5000 15000
Homeport, Ship type, and Billet 50000 15000 35000
Sabbatical 10000 5000 5000 Yes
Telecommuting 20000 5000 15000 Yes
Geographic Stability 10000 5000 5000 Yes
Incentive cost to the Navy     (7500 + 5000 + 5000 + 5000)
22,500
Adjusted bonus  150000 -   (50000 + 10000 + 20000 + 10000)
60,000
Effective cost to the Navy     (22500  + 60000)
82,500
First excluded cost to the Navy 101,250
Adjusted cash bonus (101250 - 82500)
78,750
Value to the officer (78750 +   (50000 + 10000 + 20000 + 10000))
168,750
This is the equivalent amount all winning bidders will receive.
It was the 118th lowest value among all entries for 
"Effective cost to the Navy."
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Figure 41.   NPS Current Paygrade 
 83















COMTHIRDFLT   (San
Diego/Everett/Pearl)
COMFIFTHFLT   (Bahrain)




Figure 43.   NPS Homeport  
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Figure 45.   NPS Ethnicity 
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Figure 47.   NPS Degree Level 
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APPENDIX C.   SWO VITAL SIGNS 
 
Figure 48.   SWO Vital Signs – June 2007 
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Figure 52.   Fleet Current Paygrade 
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Figure 54.   Fleet Homeport Breakdown 
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Figure 56.   Fleet Ethnicity Breakdown 
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Figure 58.   Fleet Education Level 
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